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Conclusions
The Deconstructive Power of the Russian Revolution
The time that has passed since the beginning of the Russian 
Revolution is long enough to work out some interpretative 
formulas of its consequences. In the 19th century, in his treaties 
about the Western world and Russia, the Russian poet and political 
thinker Fyodor Tyutchev (1803–1873) described the latter as the 
embodiment of an eternal providential empire whose mission 
is continually distorted by a diabolic power – the Revolution 
(Тютчев, 2013). As it turned out after a couple of decades, it was 
just Russia that became both the victim and the den of evil: the 
Revolution of 1917 took a specifically Russian shape even though 
it originally refuted the national idea.
In the course of time, the state that had grown on the 
revolutionary soil changed its image several times. According 
to Chaadaev’s generalizations, which were mentioned in 
the introduction, Russia is abnormally vulnerable to radical 
transformations. This does not necessarily refer only to the great 
shifts of paradigms such as the Petrine reforms or the collapse of 
the old empire and the establishment of a communist state. Even 
within the Soviet period, everyday life and institutions looked 
significantly different in 1924, 1938, 1957 or in the 1970s. Dmitry 
Trenin realizes that in the very beginning the Russian Revolution 
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was permeated by universalistic messianism. However, in the 
mid-1920s the paradigm of the Soviet state turned into a fortress 
mentality: the USSR was the only genuinely socialist country in 
the world (as it was in the case of the only Orthodox state – the 
Third Rome – in the 16th century) surrounded by capitalist powers. 
After WW2, we dealt with “the socialist camp”, and after 1960 – 
with “the socialist community” which fought against the “world 
imperialism” with the United States at the helm. This competition 
led to longitudinal tension and to the collapse of the USSR in the 
end (Trenin, 2012, pp. 274–275).
Trying to answer the questions which were declared as the 
leitmotif of our study, we can initially point to the conclusion that 
the ideas, actions and consequences of the revolution result from 
a certain kind of unnaturalness. Its base is formed by the belief in 
the necessity of legal supremacy of ideas, such as the happiness of 
the people or the glory of a state or nation, over everyday needs 
and individual ambitions. The revolution originally fulfilled the 
dreams of several generations of Russian Marxists and Populists 
(Narodniki), who preached about the oppression which was 
experienced by the Russian people, especially peasants and 
workers. However, the new system managed to rob them of any 
individual property and individual rights. The life and dreams of 
the individual turned out to be trivial in the clash with the “just 
cause”: a peasant who, just before WW1, was ultimately liberated 
from control and became the owner of his plot of land had to first 
face the duty of compulsory deliveries after 1917 and then, after 
1928, the tragedy of collectivization.
Another source of unnaturalness lies in the conviction that 
the state (or any other collective organization) has a universal or 
divine mission. The pattern of such thinking comes from great 
religions, e.g. Shinto, Zoroastrianism, Judaism, Christianity or 
Islam. These missions, however, are generally oriented toward 
transcendental reality even if they concern human behavior and 
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preoccupations. In the case of the Russian Revolution, contrary 
to most of the previous ones, it is a deterministic, post-Hegelian 
scheme that underlay the revolutionary actions and lawmaking. 
The assumption that the state might play an important part 
in the divine plan is close to the idea of the Byzantine diarchy 
or the Islamic caliphate, so one can seek some earlier patterns. 
Nevertheless, all of them treat the supernatural world as the main 
point of reference. In the case of the Marxist Revolution, the 
ultimate cause lies in the earthly state itself.
Such an attitude is linked to the idea that the essence of the 
mission can be expressed and successfully realized in laws and 
political actions. Law in the revolutionary perspective was 
treated neither as a set of practical regulations that can make 
the functioning of the state and society safer and more effective 
nor as a realization of a higher order. There was a lot of criticism 
of law in Russia under the old regime: it was usually accused of 
overregulation and allegiance to conservative values. However, 
the legal framework of the empire made it ineffective only in some 
way, whereas the Soviet law created a totally dysfunctional state, 
which finally collapsed after 70 years of totalitarian management. 
After the revolution, several legal solutions, as we can read in the 
first chapter, still influence today’s Russian legislation, especially 
in the area of business and the relation of citizens with foreign 
legal and natural persons.
The essential place of law in the structure of Russia’s 
dysfunctionality cannot be neglected. As a number of researchers 
have noted, law in Russia is perceived not as a core social value 
but as an instrument for the leaders. In the long history of the 
country, law was often criticized as a barrier to efficient policies. 
It is the central authority that is equipped with common trust and 
a providential mission. The same can be said about the advantage 
of politics over the economy. It is the central power that has always 
decided about the shape of economic relations. The situation is 
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not very different in today’s capitalist Russia, where all basic flows 
are controlled by the administration (Bieleń, 2014, pp. 211–212).
The unnaturalness of the main convictions in revolutionary 
thinking also stems from the belief that human needs are permanent 
and that there is an intelligible way in which we could meet them. 
The Russian Empire was authoritarian, not totalitarian, requiring 
obedience but not necessarily spiritual devotion (contrary to 
Pre-Petrine Moscovia). Some of the populist and revolutionary 
socialists, especially Petr Tkachov, postulated the standardization 
of needs and the physical liquidation of the older generation, which 
was supposed to be incapable of building a brave new and totally 
structuralized society. This kind of thinking was taken over by the 
Bolsheviks who created a political, economic and social system 
which lacked mental diversity. The system was uniform under the 
vertical leadership of the party, the economy was a leading example 
of inefficient central planning. In the area of culture and education, 
for a long time only the correct ideological (Marxist) and artistic 
(socialist realistic) lines were accepted. However, what seems 
paradoxical, it is the non-conformist activity that contributed 
to relative success in the USSR: the space breakthroughs, sport 
achievements or famous pieces in the movie industry or literature 
with Pasternak and Solzhenitsyn.
The second essential problem of the following study lies in 
the issue of equality: the problem of the people and of the elite. 
Whereas natural order (at least in the Hoppean explication) 
assumes a spontaneous emergence of nobilitas naturalis, the 
Bolshevik doctrine imposes different solutions. First of all, it 
aims at the creation of an entirely egalitarian society. This vision 
is by all means utopian but many studies on totalitarian utopias 
describe and cleverly generalize such phenomena. The Bolshevik 
dream neglects natural differences probably not only because it is 
a utopian idea. The attempt, which was doomed to fail from the 
very beginning, was in fact a powerful step toward the eradication 
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of these disproportions. It was a dramatic struggle of those who 
were highly dissatisfied with the shape of the real world in which 
they were born: in the wrong country or ethnic group, in the 
wrong place or social class.
Measures were undertaken to even the social and economic 
status of Russian citizens: people of the lowest classes became 
officers and state officials, representatives of the nobility and 
bourgeoisie were expelled and even food was rationed at the very 
beginning of the Bolshevik era (according to the regulations of 
war communism). However, after a decade it turned out that there 
were some citizens who were more equal than others. Since the 
1930s, the Stalinist regime consisted not only in the totalitarian 
dictatorship of one person but also in the power of the secret police, 
which had enormous prerogatives. Then, in the 1960s and 1970s 
the nomenklatura, a certain new class of well-established party 
officials, began to dominate in spite of the egalitarian ideology 
(Đilas, 1957). Even in the circumstances of such an ideological 
atmosphere, the system appeared incapable of any successful 
struggle against natural processes of the circulation of elites. 
After the collapse of the red empire, in the 1990s, the Family 
(the people closest to President Boris Yeltsyn) and the oligarchs 
became the new elite of the “robbed country”. Since 2000, the Putin 
team of secret service and military officials have established their 
supremacy in the name of the struggle against the old and bad 
oligarchy within the country and against the Western domination 
in international relations. In none of the cases has the Russian 
political system helped to work out a nobilitas naturalis that would 
be allowed to develop the country in an unrestricted way. The old 
oligarchs gained their property because of their connections with 
those who controlled the financial flows and decided about the 
economic shape of the country. However, they generally took 
advantage of their own smartness and initiative. The new elite 
predominantly used violence and restrictions subordinating the 
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Russian economy to the expectations of statists but the level of 
inequality within the country became even more appalling. 
This, in the end, makes us inquire about the relation between 
the revolution and the natural order. The notion of natural order 
includes several disputable aspects. First of all, it does not refer 
directly to the state of nature. Contrary to that, it combines two 
tendencies. On the one hand, it is based on realism concerning 
the laws of nature, i.e. human corporeality. On the other – it 
tries to meet something actually absent in nature: the need for 
harmonious development in the material and mental spheres. For 
some it might be the never ending search for the undefinable dào 
(道); for others – a quest for a life formed according to the biblical 
commandments and reflections: “fill the earth and subdue it” 
(Genesis, 1, 28), “For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither 
are your ways my ways (Isaiah, 55, 8–9)” and St. Augustine’s famous 
conviction that “You have made us for yourself, O Lord, and our 
heart is restless until it rests in you” (Augustine, Confessions, Lib. 
1,1–2,2.5,5; CSEL 33, 1–5).
Such a concept is by no means abstract. Contrary to many 
“realistic” theories, it leads the analyst to the study of real processes 
in which one focuses on the technological, economic and social 
development of nations. There is no such thing as unlimited 
development in the state of nature but it can be considered if one 
refers to natural order. It is possible to describe the demographic 
dynamics, which seems to be relatively positive from the perspective 
of the whole of mankind but not necessarily in the case of Russia 
and the West. It is not difficult to estimate life expectancy, infant 
mortality, the length of time a citizen must be employed to afford 
one square foot of real estate or the participation in NCO. Even 
the level of happiness becomes an object of sociological research 
(Левада-Центр, 2014). In other words, it is relatively possible 
to estimate to what extent a state or a certain system meets the 
expectations of regular and, what is no less important, unrestricted 
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development of the citizens, so that they continually get healthier 
and happier but also increasingly motivated to reach the next 
stages of health, satisfaction, wealth and happiness.
There is no doubt that such categories (as mentioned above) 
can be expressed only by means of indirect statistical indicators. 
However, if compared to the revolutionary imperatives such 
as equality, brotherhood or social justice, they still seem quite 
scientific.
If one looks critically at the categories of natural order and 
those of the revolution, it is possible to discern a specific relation 
between them since the revolutionary thinking is by no means 
autonomous; it is a dark shadow of the natural search for goodness. 
Let us have a look at the basic oppositions which are relevant to 
the natural order paradigm and the new proposal promoted by 
Bolshevism. For a reasonable simplification, we will use the term 
“traditional” for the categories of the natural order paradigm and 
the adjective “revolutionary” to express the ones that underlie the 
revolutionary thinking.
1. The traditional opposition of prosperity versus poverty was 
replaced by the revolutionary one of social justice versus social 
injustice.
2. The traditional opposition of God-given individual freedom 
versus slavery (created by imperfect man) was replaced by the 
revolutionary one of freedom as consciousness of necessity 
versus class unconsciousness.
3. The traditional opposition of political liberty – totalitarianism 
was replaced by the revolutionary one of liberation of the 
proletariat versus social oppression.
4. The traditional opposition of human dignity – degradation 
(animalization) was replaced by the revolutionary one of 
communist relations of production versus historically 
backward relations of production. The individual dignity for 
the Bolsheviks was only a product of the superstructure (comp. 
Bochenski, 1963, pp. 119–120).
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5. The traditional opposition of legal equality versus legal 
inequality was replaced by the revolutionary one of equality in 
the access to goods versus inequality in the access to goods.
6. The traditional opposition of respect for property versus theft 
was replaced by the revolutionary one of liberation from 
private property versus kulak mentality.
7. The traditional opposition of respect for individual life and 
health versus murder/disrespect for health was replaced by the 
revolutionary one of respect for the “collective man” (individual 
lives were obviously unimportant) versus disrespect for the 
interests of the proletariat (Fülöp-Miller, 1965, pp. 7–8).
8. The traditional opposition of solidarity versus discord was 
replaced by the revolutionary one of class consciousness 
(comp. Goldman, 1971, pp. 69–70) versus class treason.
9. The traditional opposition of competition for perfection versus 
destructive uniformity was replaced by the revolutionary one 
of collective work (Stakhanov ethic) versus sabotage.
10. The traditional opposition of equal opportunities versus 
unequal opportunities was replaced by the revolutionary 
one of the satisfaction of needs vs failure to satisfy needs 
(according to the belief that “all stomachs are created equal”).
11. The traditional opposition of highest harmony versus chaos 
was replaced by the revolutionary one of classless society 
versus class struggle.
12. Last but not least, the traditional opposition of nobilitas 
naturalis versus populus naturalis was replaced by the 
revolutionary one of the avant-garde of the proletariat (the 
Party) versus the Proletariat itself (the not entirely self-
conscious subject of historical development). 
As observed in Toynbee’s Study of History, after some time 
the creative minority inevitably turns into the dominant minority 
(Toynbee, 1939, pp. 35ff, 445ff, 459ff) However, the natural elite 
is not a closed and established class. It is rather a constantly 
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changing group where some people are continually replaced by 
others as a result of the functioning market. The avant-garde of 
the proletariat is a different story: the party members become 
state officials and are able to establish laws that protect them from 
natural competition (Đilas, 1957).
This short overview opens the door to generalization: one may 
realize that the new revolutionary oppositions can be described 
as deconstructed forms of the traditional ones. We decided to 
categorize the revolutionary paradigm in such a way because the 
Russian Revolution turned against many more values than the 
ones represented by the old regime. The Bolsheviks and other 
radical revolutionaries tried to demolish any inequality without 
reflection about the natural character of the emergence of elites and 
avoided considerations about the temporariness and randomness 
of injustice in their own lives and in the whole Russian Empire.
Finally, there is an obvious need for a glimpse into the relation 
between the Russian Revolution and natural order in the pragmatic 
perspective. An objective and just evaluation of the revolution and 
the following Soviet period in Russian history is hardly possible. 
As stated in the second chapter of our book, Russia still looks at 
itself through the prism of its Soviet past and is by all means under 
the impression of the trauma that arose after the collapse of the 
red empire.
In many bitter ways, the Russia of the 21st century is still a shadow 
of its previous greatness both in the material and moral dimensions. 
According to Maxim Kalashnikov, who resorts to Victor I. Petrik’s 
sociological research, the Post-Soviet anthropological type is 
much more passive than its Soviet predecessor. Today’s Russia 
has become a state where the leading role both in ideology and 
economy belongs to “ruminants” (жвачные) – people who do 
not believe that a technological breakthrough is possible in their 
country: everything important has already been invented and 
even if there is a chance of some new ideas, they will appear in the 
West rather than in Russia (Калашников, 2014, p. 188).
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This nostalgic tone, however, seems to be justified only if 
one compares the Soviet times with the period of the Russian 
Federation. A comparison of the economic dynamics of the 
Russian Empire in the last decades of its existence with analogous 
data concerning the USSR leaves no doubt. No one could neglect 
the obvious achievements in education, science or health care in 
the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, it is essential to remember that 
GDP per capita, if related to the level of more advanced countries, 
fell from 28% – 30% in 1913 to 16 – 18% in 1990 (Meliantsev, 
2004, pp. 106, 120). In other words, the balance of the old times 
was more impressive.
The problem obviously lies not only in the disputable 
achievements in the country’s economy. Under the early Bolshevik 
regime and in the USSR, the inhabitants of the huge territory 
experienced unprecedented terror. There are various estimates as 
to the number of victims in the Soviet Union. Hosking (2001, p. 
469) supposes that only in the 1930s the death toll reached about 
10-11 million. If one takes into account the victims of the Red 
Terror, the unnecessary casualties during WW2 and the prisoners 
of the Gulags, we are left with the image of a demographic disaster. 
Ruined health, broken personalities, and a slave mentality of the 
Homo Sovieticus are the next signs of destruction that became the 
daily bread of millions. 
Can the successor of the USSR be treated as a country that 
rejected all Soviet curses? It seems that pessimistic opinions prevail 
among average Russians. A clever explanation of the economic 
and civilizational failure was provided by Andrei Piontkovsky, 
who makes a distinction between the economic reforms in Russia 
and Central Europe. In the latter, privatization was clearly “unjust” 
since many of the previous managers came into property that had 
never been theirs in the legal sense. However, they took care of 
it anyway and were able to act in the circumstances of the free 
market. This led to natural competition, where the “unrighteous” 
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brainy leaders pushed the less efficient ones out of the market. 
The same was expected in Russia but the result was different. The 
“principle of injustice” was not limited to the moment of original 
distribution but was continued in the next two decades. The new 
formation is continually mutating, remaining neither capitalist 
nor socialist. The oligarchs became mandarins rather than 
business people and managed to rob Russia of enormous wealth, 
which then appeared on their accounts beyond the borders of the 
Eurasian Economic Union (Piontkovsky, 2011, p. 392).
The Russian Revolution not only became a tragically consistent 
attempt to realize a utopian gnostic vision, based on radical 
oppositions, but also a far-reaching process in which, willingly or 
not, the new distinctions appeared to be a deconstructed version 
of those which are dictated by the logic of Natural Order. In 
this sense the legacy of the Russian Revolution is a gigantic lie, 
a false mirror which still torments the citizens in the largest part 
of the post-Soviet area: the official rhetoric remains populist but 
the state – strictly oligarchic. The idea of international diversity 
and multipolarity is a hidden concept of leaving a great number 
of nations without security and the rejection of today’s internal 
and international leadership is only a hidden and selfish form 
of promoting another order of much more severe inequality. 
The idea of brotherhood justifies the invasion of brothers. The 
declared necessity of strength is in fact a desperate attempt to 
regain lost respect. New legal regulations are a result of fear rather 
than of self-confidence: the gnostic vision of us as the light side of 
the force and the internal and foreign challenge as a destructive 
element whose activity has to be averted, is another attempt to 
build oppositions that have nothing in common with natural 
order, where everybody is invited to compete and cooperate at the 
same time.
